Recently the dynamics of signed networks, where the ties among the agents can be both positive (attractive) or negative (repulsive) have attracted substantial attention of the research community. Examples of such networks are models of opinion dynamics over signed graphs. It has been shown that under mild connectivity assumptions these protocols provide the convergence of opinions in absolute value, whereas their signs may differ. This "modulus consensus" may correspond to the bipartite consensus (the opinions split into two clusters, converging to two opposite values) or the asymptotic stability of the system (the opinions always converge to zero).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years protocols for consensus and synchronization in multi-agent networks have been thoroughly studied [2] - [5] . Much less studied are "irregular" behaviors, exhibited by many real-world networks, such as e.g. cluster synchronization, partial synchronization, desynchronization and chaos [6] - [8] . An important step in understanding these complex behaviors is to elaborate mathematical models for "partial" or cluster synchronization, or simply clustering [6] , [9] , [10] . In social influence theory, this problem is known as the community cleavage problem or Abelson's diversity puzzle [11] , [12] : to disclose mechanisms that hinder reaching consensus among social actors and lead to splitting of their opinions into several clusters.
One reason for clustering in multi-agent networks is the presence of "negative" (repulsive, antagonistic) interactions among the agents [9] . Models of signed (or "coopetition") A 8 , and RFBR, grants 17-08-01728, 17-08-00715 and 17-08-01266. Theorem 1 is obtained at IPME RAS under the sole support of Russian Science Foundation (RSF) grant 14-29-00142. networks with positive and negative couplings among the nodes describe a broad class of real-world systems, from molecular ensembles [13] to continental supply chains [14] . Positive and negative relations among social actors can express, respectively, trust (friendship) or distrust (hostility). Negative ties among the individuals may also result from the reactance or boomerang effects, first described in [15] : an individual may not only resist the persuasion process, but even adopt an attitude that is contrary to the persuader's one.
A simple yet instructive model of continuous-time opinion dynamics over signed networks has been proposed by Altafini [16] , [17] and extended to the discrete-time case in [18] - [20] . In the recent years, Altafini-type coordination protocols over static and time-varying signed graphs have been extensively studied, see e.g. [18] - [26] . It has been shown that under mild connectivity assumptions these models exhibit consensus in absolute value, or modulus consensus: the agents' opinions agree in modulus yet may differ in signs. In the recent works [1] , [27] it has been shown that the effect of modulus consensus in the continuous-time Altafini model is in fact a manifestation of a more profound result, concerned with the special class of differential inequalitieṡ
where L(t) stands for the Laplacian matrix of a time-varying weighted graph. Although the inequality (1) is a seemingly "loose" constraint, any of its bounded solutions (under natural connectivity assumptions) converges to a consensus equilibrium (this property is called consensus dichotomy). This implies, in particular, the modulus consensus in the Altafini model [1] , [27] since the vector of the opinions' absolute values obeys the inequality (1). In this paper, we extend the theory of differential inequalities to the discretetime case, where (1) is replaced by the recurrent inequality
being a sequence of stochastic matrices. We establish the consensus dichotomy criteria for these inequalities, which imply the recent results on modulus consensus in the discrete-time Altafini model [19] . We also apply the recurrent inequalities to some problems of matrix theory and the analysis of distributed algorithms for optimization and linear equations solving.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We start with preliminaries and introducing some notation.
A. Preliminaries
First we introduce some notation. A vector x ∈ R n is non-negative (x ≥ 0) if x i ≥ 0 ∀i. Given two vectors x, y ∈ R n , we write x ≥ y (respectively, x ≤ y) if x − y ≥ 0 (respectively, y − x ≥ 0). The vector of ones is denoted by 1 n = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n . Given a matrix A = (a ij ), we use |A| = (|a ij |) to denote the matrix of element-wise absolute values (the same rule applies to vectors). A matrix A = (a ij ) is stochastic if its entries are non-negative and all rows sum to 1, i.e. j a ij = 1 ∀i. We use ρ(A) to denote the spectral radius of a square matrix A. The standard Euclidean norm of a vector x is denoted by
B. Recurrent inequalities and consensus dichotomy.
In this paper, we are interested in the solutions of the following discrete-time, or recurrent, inequality
where x(k) ∈ R n is a sequence of vectors and W (k) ∈ R n×n stands for a sequence of stochastic matrices. Replacing the inequality in (2) by the equality, one obtains the well-known averaging, or consensus protocol [30] - [32] x
dating back to the early works on social influence [33] , [34] , rational decision making [35] and distributed optimization [36] . The algorithm (3) may be interpreted as the dynamics of opinions 2 formation in a network of n agents. At each step of the opinion iteration k agent i calculates the weighted average of its own opinion x i (k) and the others' opinions; this average is used as the new opinion of the ith agent x i (k + 1) = j w ij (k)x j (k). The graph G[W (k)] naturally represents the interaction topology of the network at step k. Agent i is influenced by agent j if w ij (k) > 0, otherwise the jth agent's opinion x j (k) plays no role in the formation of the new agent i's opinion x i (k + 1).
A similar interpretation can be given to the inequality (2). Unlike the algorithm (3), the opinion of agent i at each step of opinion formation is not uniquely determined by the opinions from the previous step, but is only constrained by them x i (k + 1) ≤ j w ij (k)x j (k). The weight w ij (k) stands for the contribution of agent j's opinion x j (k) to this constraint, and in this sense it can also be treated as the "influence" weight. The inequality (2) does not provide the solution's uniqueness for a given x(0), but only guarantees the existence of an upper bound for the solutions.
Proposition 1: Any solution of (2) obeys the inequality 1 We assume that the reader is familiar with the standard concepts of graph theory, regarding directed graphs and their connectivity properties, e.g. walks (or paths), cycles and strongly connected components [28] , [29] . 2 In the broad sense, "opinion" is just a scalar quantity of interest; it can stand for e.g. a physical parameters or an attitude to some event or issue. Although many solutions of (2) are unbounded from below, under certain assumptions any its bounded solution converges to a consensus equilibrium c1 n , where c ∈ R. A similar property, called consensus dichotomy 3 has been established in [1] , [27] for the differential inequalities (1).
Definition 1: The inequality (2) is said to be dichotomic if any of its bounded (from below) solutions has a limit
The main goal of this paper is to disclose criteria of consensus dichotomy in the recurrent inequalities (2) . In Section IV we discuss applications of these criteria to models of opinion dynamics and algorithms of distributed optimization.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The first step is to examine time-invariant inequalities (2).
A. A dichotomy criterion for the time-invariant case
In this subsection, we assume that W (k) ≡ W is a constant matrix, whose graph G (2) with the static matrix W (k) ≡ W is dichotomic if and only if all the strong components G 1 , . . . , G s of its graph G are isolated and aperiodic 4 . The inequality is consensus dichotomic if and only if G is strongly connected (s = 1) and aperiodic, or, equivalently, the matrix W is primitive [29] , [38] .
The proof of Theorem 1, as well as the remaining results of this section, is omitted due to the page limit and is available in the extended version of this paper [39] .
Remark 1: Let V j stand for the set of nodes of G j . Theorem 1 shows that the time-invariant dichotomic inequality (2) reduces to s independent inequalities of lower dimensions
where x (m) (k) = (x i (k)) i∈Vm , W (m) = (w ij ) i,j∈Vm and each inequality (4) is consensus dichotomic. Remark 2: The matrix is primitive if and only if [12] , [29] , [38] its powers W k are strictly positive for large k.
B. Consensus dichotomy in the time-varying case
In this subsection, we extend the result of Theorem 1 to the case of general time-varying inequality (2) . Given ε > 0, let S ε denote the class of all stochastic matrices W = (w ij ) i,j∈V , satisfying the two conditions:
In other words, removing from the graph G[W ] all "light" arcs weighted by less than ε, the remaining subgraph G ε [W ] is strongly connected and has self-loops at each node.
For any integers
stand for the evolutionary matrix of the equation (3); for convenience, we denote Φ(k, k) = I n . It is obvious that any solution of (2) satisfies also the family of inequalities
The following theorem provides a consensus dichotomy criterion for the case of the time-varying matrix W (k).
Theorem 2: The inequality (2) is consensus dichotomic if ε > 0 exists that satisfies the following condition: for any
Notice that for the static matrix W (k) ≡ W one has Φ(m, k) = W m−k , so the condition from Theorem 2 means that W s ∈ S ε for some s. It can be easily shown that in this case W s(n−1) is a strictly positive matrix. On the other hand, if W d is strictly positive for some d, then W d ∈ S ε for sufficiently small ε > 0. In view of Remark 2 and Theorem 1, in the static case W (k) ≡ W the sufficient condition of consensus dichotomy from Theorem 2 is in fact also necessary, boiling down to the primitivity of W .
The condition from Theorem 2 is implied by the two standard assumptions on the sequence {W (k)} k≥0 .
Assumption 1: There exists δ > 0 such that for any k ≥ 0 1) w ii (k) ≥ δ for any i = 1, . . . , n;
2) for any i, j such that i = j one has w ij (k) ∈ {0}∪[δ; 1]. Assumption 2: (Repeated joint strong connectivity) There exists an integer B ≥ 1 such that the graph G[W (k) + . . . + W (k + B − 1)] is strongly connected for any k.
Corollary 1: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the inequality (2) is consensus dichotomic.
Proof: We are going to show that the condition from Theorem 2 holds for ε = δ B and m = k + B, i.e.
Applying this to m = k + B, one easily notices that i is connected to j in the graph G δ B [Φ(k + B, k) ] whenever w ij (l) > 0 for some l = k, . . . , k + B − 1. Assumption 2 implies now that Φ(k + B, k) ∈ S δ B for any k.
It should be noticed however that the condition of Theorem 2 may hold in many situations where Assumptions 1 and 2 fail. Even in the static case W (k) ≡ W , the matrix W can be primitive yet have zero diagonal entries. The following corollary illustrates another situation where both Assumptions 1 and 2 may fail, whereas Theorem 2 guarantees consensus dichotomy.
Corollary 2: Suppose that for any k one has W (k) ∈ {W 0 }∪W, where W 0 stands for the primitive matrix and W is a set of stochastic matrices, commuting with W 0 :
Then the inequality (2) is consensus dichotomic.
Proof: Let d be so large that W d 0 is a positive matrix, whose minimal entry equals ε > 0. For any k, we can find such m > k that the sequence k, k + 1, . . . , m − 1 contains d elements from the set K 0 . Since any W (j) commutes with
where T k is some stochastic matrix, and thus all entries of Φ(m, k) are not less than ε.
Many sequences {W (k)}, satisfying the conditions of Corollary 2, fail to satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. For instance, if W I n then the sequence {W (k)} can contain an arbitrary long subsequence of consecutive identity matrices, which violates Assumption 2. Both the matrix W 0 and matrices from W may have zero diagonal entries, which also violates Assumption 1. The set W can also be non-compact, containing matrices with arbitrary small yet non-zero entries.
C. The case of bidirectional interaction
It is known that in the case of bidirectional graphs w ij > 0 ⇔ w ji > 0 the conditions for consensus in the network (3) is reached under very modest connectivity assumptions. Under Assumption 1, consensus is reached if and only if the following relaxed version of Assumption 2 holds [31] .
Assumption 3: (Infinite joint strong connectivity) The graph G ∞ = (V, E ∞ ) is strongly connected, where
The following result extends this consensus criterion to the condition of consensus dichotomy in the inequality (2) .
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 and 3 hold and for any k one has w ij (k) > 0 ⇔ w ji (k) > 0. Then the inequality (2) is consensus dichotomic.
The relaxation of Assumption 1 in Theorem 3 remains a non-trivial open problem. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the same applies to usual consensus algorithms (3): most of the existing results for consensus in discrete-time switching networks [3] , [30] - [32] rely on Assumption 1 or at least require uniformly positive diagonal entries w ii (k).
IV. EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS
In this section we apply the criteria from Section III to the analysis of several multi-agent coordination protocols.
A. Modulus consensus in the discrete-time Altafini model
We first consider the discrete-time Altafini model [18] - [20] of opinion formation in a signed network. This model is similar to the consensus protocol (3) and is given by
Here the matrix (a ij (k)) satisfies the following assumption. Assumption 4: For any k = 0, 1, . . ., the matrix A(k) = (a ij (k)) has non-negative diagonal entries a ii (k) ≥ 0, and the modulus matrix |A(k)| = (|a ij (k)|) is stochastic.
The non-diagonal entries a ij (k) in (5) may be both positive and negative. Considering the elements ξ i (k) as "opinions" of n agents, the positive value a ij (k) > 0 can be treated as trust or attraction among agents i and j. In this case, agent i shifts its opinion towards the opinion of agent j. Similarly, the negative value a ij (k) < 0 stands for distrust or repulsion among the agents: the ith agent's opinion is shifted away from the opinion of agent j. The central question concerned with the model (5) is reaching consensus in absolute values [19] , [26] , or modulus consensus.
Definition 2: We say that modulus consensus is established by the protocol (5) if the coincident limits exist
The absolute values x i (k) = |ξ i (k)| obey the inequalities
and hence the vector x(k) = (x 1 (k), . . . , x n (k)) obeys (2) with W (k) = |A(k)|. If this recurrent inequality is consensus dichotomic, then modulus consensus in (5) is established. Theorems 2 and 3 yield in in the following criterion. Theorem 4: Modulus consensus in (5) is established, if the sequence of matrices W (k) = |A(k)| satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 or Theorem 3.
In particular, if Assumption 1 holds, then modulus consensus is ensured by the repeated strong connectivity (Assumption 2), which can be relaxed to the infinite strong connectivity (Assumption 3) if the network is bidirectional w ij (k) > 0 ⇔ w ji (k) > 0. Theorem 4 includes thus the results of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in [19] . As discussed in Section III, the condition from Theorem 2 holds in many situations where Assumption 1 fails, e.g. W (k) ≡ W may be a constant primitive matrix with zero diagonal entries. Unlike consensus algorithms (3), where the gains w ij (k) are design parameters, the social influence (or "social power") of an individual over another one depends on many uncertain factors [40] , and the uniform positivity of the non-zero gains |a ij (k)| may become a restrictive assumption.
The most interesting case of modulus consensus is bipartite consensus, or "bimodal polarization": the agents split into two groups, whose opinions converge to two opposite (non-zero) values. Modulus consensus is also established, however, if the system is asymptotically stable, i.e., all opinions converge to 0. We do not consider here conditions criteria for bipartite consensus and stability, which can be found e.g. in the recent works [26] (see also Theorem 2.3 in [19] ). Notice, however, that the criteria from [26] primarily deal with the case of exponentially convergent Altafini's model, whereas the general criterion from Theorem 4, in general, does not guarantee exponential convergence.
B. Substochastic matrices and the Friedkin-Johnsen model
A non-negative matrix A = (a ij ) is called substochastic if n j=1 a ij = 1 ∀i. We say that the ith row of A is a deficiency row of A if the latter inequality is strict j a ij < 1. Unlike a stochastic matrix, always having an eigenvalue at 1, a substochastic square matrix is usually Schur stable ρ(A) < 1. Theorem 1 allows to give an elegant proof of the Schur stability criterion for substochastic matrices [41] , [42] .
be the graph of a substochastic square matrix A and I d = {i : j a ij < 1} is the subset of its nodes, corresponding to the deficiency rows of A. If any node j either belongs to the set I d , or I d is reachable from it in G via some walk, then ρ(A) < 1.
Proof: Consider the matrix W = (w ij ), defined by
Obviously, W = (w ij ) is stochastic and w ij > a ij ≥ 0 ∀j when i ∈ I d . Hence in the graph G[W ] each node i ∈ I d is connected to any other node and to itself, and hence G[W ] is aperiodic. The condition of Lemma 1 implies that G[W ] is also strongly connected. Choosing an arbitrary non-negative vector x 0 ≥ 0, the vectors x(k) = A k x 0 are non-negative for any k ≥ 0 and satisfy the inequality (2) with W (k) ≡ W . Thanks to Theorem 1, x(k) → c1, where c ≥ 0. It remains to notice that 1 is not an eigenvector of A since I d (A) = ∅, and hence c = 0. Thus A k x 0 → 0 as k → ∞ for any x 0 ≥ 0, which implies the Schur stability of A since any vector x 0 is a difference of two non-negative vectors. Notice that Lemma 1 implies the following well-known property of substochastic irreducible matrices [38] : if G is strongly connected then A is either stochastic or Schur stable. The condition from Lemma 1 is not only sufficient but also necessary for the Schur stability [42] . Lemma 1 implies the condition of opinion convergence in the Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion formation [11] , [42] , [43] x(k) = ΛW x(k) + (I − Λ)u, u = x(0).
Here W is a stochastic matrix of influence weights, and Λ is a diagonal matrix of the agents' susceptibilities to the social influence [43] , 0 ≤ λ ii ≤ 1. Without loss of generality, one may suppose that λ ii = 0 ⇔ w ii = 1; in this case agent i is stubborn x i (k) ≡ x i (0) (often it is assumed [43] that λ ii = 1 − w ii ). Another extremal case is λ ii = 1, which means that agent i "forgets" its initial opinion u i = x i (0) and iterates the usual procedure of opinion averaging x i (k+1) = j w ij x j (k). If 0 < λ ii < 1, then agent i is "partially stubborn" or prejudiced [12] , [44] : such an agent adopts the others' opinions, however it is "attached" to its initial opinion x i (0) and factors it into every opinion iteration. If the substochastic matrix ΛW is Schur stable, then the opinion vector x(k) in (7) converges to the equilibrium
By noticing that the graphs G[ΛW ] and G[W ] differ only by the structure of self-loops (recall that λ ii > 0 unless w ii = 1 and w ij = 0 ∀j = i), Lemma 1 implies the following. Corollary 3: [42] The opinions (8) converge if from each agent i with λ ii = 1 there exists a walk in G[W ] to some agent j with λ jj < 1, that is, each agent is either prejudiced or influenced (directly or indirectly) by a prejudiced agent.
Using Theorems 2 and 3, some stability criteria for the time-varying extension [44] of the Friedkin-Johnsen model can be obtained that are beyond the scope of this paper.
C. Constrained consensus
In this subsection, we consider another application of the recurrent inequalities case, related to the problem of constrained or "optimal" consensus that is closely related to distributed convex optimization [45] - [47] and distributed algorithms, solving linear equations [48] - [50] .
For any closed convex set Ω ⊂ R d and x ∈ R d the projection operator P Ω : x ∈ R d → P Ω (x) ∈ Ω can be defined, mapping a point to the closest element of Ω, i.e. x − P Ω (x) = min y∈Ω x − y . This implies that (y − P Ω (x), x − P Ω (x)) ≥ π/2 (Fig. 2 ) and
is a convex function. Consider a group of n discrete-time agents with the state vectors ξ i (k) ∈ R d . Each agent is associated with a closed convex set Ξ i ⊆ R d (e.g., the set of minima of some convex function). The agents' cooperative goal is to find some point ξ * ∈ Ξ Δ = Ξ 1 ∩ . . . ∩ Ξ n . To solve this problem, various modifications of the protocol (3) have been proposed. We consider the following three algorithms
Here W (k) = (w ij (k)) stands for the sequence of stochastic matrices. The protocol (10) has been proposed in the influential paper [45] (see also [47] ), dealing with distributed optimization problems. The special cases of protocols (11) and (12) naturally arise in distributed algorithms, solving linear equations, see respectively [48] , [49] and [50] ; a randomized version of (12) has been also examined in [46] . Theorem 5: Let the set Ξ i be closed and convex, and assume that Ξ = Ξ 1 ∩ . . . ∩ Ξ n = ∅. Suppose that the matrices W (k) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then each of the protocols (10)-(12) establishes constrained consensus: (13) Proof: Due to the page limit, we give only an outline of the proof. By assumption, there exists some ξ 0 ∈ Ξ. Denote P i (·) Δ = P Ξi (·), d i (·) Δ = d Ξi (·) and let η i (k) Δ = j w ij (k)ξ j (k). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, to prove the constrained consensus (13) it suffices to show [47] that
Applying (9) to Ω = Ξ i , x = ξ, y = ξ 0 ∈ Ξ i , one gets
and therefore ξ − ξ 0 ≥ P i (ξ) − ξ 0 . Each protocol (10)-(12) thus implies the recurrent inequality (2), where x i (k) Δ = ξ i (k) − ξ 0 ∀i. For instance, the equation (10) entails that
Corollary 1 implies the existence of the common limit x * = lim k→∞ x i (k) ≥ 0. We are now going to prove (14) for the protocol (10) . The second statement in (14) is obvious since d i (ξ i (k + 1)) ≡ 0. Substituting ξ = η i (k) into (15) ,
To prove (14) for the protocol (12) , notice that
Recalling that w ii (k) ≥ δ and x i (k) → x * ∀i, it can be shown that d i (ξ i (k)) → 0 and hence e i (k) = w ii (k)d i (ξ i (k)) → 0. The property (14) for the protocol (11) is proved similarly, combining the arguments from (16) and (17) .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have examined a class of recurrent inequalities (2), inspired by the analysis of "modulus consensus" in signed networks. Under natural connectivity assumptions the inequality is shown to be consensus dichotomic, that is, any of its solution is either unbounded or converges to consensus. Besides signed networks, we illustrate the applications of this profound property to some problems of matrix theory and distributed optimization algorithms.
